




## ZULFAQAR Journal of Defence Management, Social Science & Humanities

Journal homepage: <https://zulfaqarjdmssh.upnm.edu.my/index.php/zjdmssh/index>



### POLICE SPECIAL BRANCH STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN ELIMINATING THE SECOND COMMUNIST EMERGENCY IN MALAYSIA 1968-1989: AN ANALYSIS

Amer Fawwaz Mohamad Yasid<sup>a,\*</sup>, Noraini Zulkafli<sup>a</sup>, Azrul Azlan Abdul Rahman<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> of Strategic Studies, Faculty of Defence Studies & Management, National Defence University of Malaysia

\*Corresponding author: [amerfawwaz@upnm.edu.my](mailto:amerfawwaz@upnm.edu.my)

#### ARTICLE INFO

##### Article history:

Received

28-09-2020

Received in revised

11-05-2020

Accepted

15-06-2020

Available online

30-06-2020

##### Keywords:

counter-insurgency,  
communist threats,  
intelligence,  
second communist  
insurgency,  
special branch

e-ISSN: 2773-529X

Type: Article

#### ABSTRACT

Malaysia once had faced the insurgency periods which were started by Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) since 1948. However, after they were defeated by the Malayan Security Forces (MSF) in 1960, CPM had once again took the chance to revive their armed struggle by launching a full-scale attack. This marked the beginning of the Second Malaysia Emergency, which lasted for almost 21 years. This research was based on the roles and functions of the Police Special Branch in defeating the communist insurgency. The main primary data of this research was based on open interview while the secondary data were focusing on archival research and academic writings. The findings of this research shown the Police Special Branch have succeeded in eliminating the CPM armed struggled that have been ongoing for 21 years.

© Amer Fawwaz Mohamad Yasid 2020. All rights reserved.

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.58247/jdmssh-2020-0301-02>

#### Introduction

The Second Emergency marked the turning point for the SB's efficiency and preparedness, in fighting against the Communist armed insurrection, triggered by the CPM. During this time, the SB had evolved and became well-prepared. They made a lot of development and progress from the perspectives of strategy, tactics and organizational development (MOHA, 1971). One of the factors that contributed to the readiness of the SB in eliminating the CPM was the geopolitical situation and uncertainty, around the period of 1965-1966, when the Indonesian-Malaysia Confrontation had just ended a few years back. Beside from the Indonesian-Malaysia Confrontation, there was also another factor: the internal security of the political movement in Malaysia, which occurred in 1969, leading to the tragic incident of May 13<sup>th</sup> (Yuen, 2008). In addition, the security of the Southeast Asia was controlled by the Soviet Union who wanted to turn the region as their main target area for spreading Communism. Meanwhile, the Vietnam War was already at its peak in 1968 (Ghows, 2014). These events had made the Police SB became more alert with current situations of that time.

Certainly, the SB had learned from experiences and their weaknesses in the First Emergency during which the SB was unprepared, weak, and ineffective at the beginning of the Conflict (Comber, 2008). Eight years after the Emergency was revoked, the SB became better than before. The new emergency had taken the SB to the next level of revolutionary tactics and guerrilla strategies as methods used by the CPM were not only focused on the military aspect but also on the political and ideological conflicts (Chin, 1994). As the number of research on intelligence tactics and strategies that emphasizes on Police Special Branch were limited, due to its confidentiality, Hence, this paper will explain the tactics and strategies carried out and implemented by the SB in fighting against the CPM during the Second Emergency.

### **The Organizational Development of the SB Organization in the Second Emergency.**

There had been significant development on the SB's organizational structure, since early 1970s. This development was vital to the SB's efficiency since they learned from past experiences. The First Emergency was a period where their organization was vulnerable (Comber, 2008). The development of the SB's organization was significant and effective in hunting down the CPM through large scale operations. These operations were extremely important, because in later 1970s, the CPM had instigated large scale atrocities on Kuala Lumpur and other states (Navaratnam, 2001). The SB was one of the Department of the Royal Malaysia Police. Their organization and units were efficiently reorganized, dividing every unit under the SB into their specific scope of duty.

As a result, the SB were able to conduct the right operatives and were able to utilize it their specialization and skills particularly in hunting down the CPM movement all over the country. The CPM also had employed various new strategies and tactics, adopting methods learnt from observing the Viet Cong in their war against the US Military Forces, in Vietnam (Jeshurun, 1976). A new period of warfare, therefore, acquires new strategy. Thus, the SB must reorganize their structure, in order to eliminate the enemy effectively. Every unit under the SB must work closely to ensure that there would not be any clashes, especially, when conducting duties given by the headquarters. In order to understand the whole structure of the SB, the organization chart and their functions are shown below:

#### **Department under SB and Their Roles and Function**

##### **i. E1 Communism**

During the Second Emergency, E1 was the main department who was in charge of the operations against the CPM. For instance, counterinsurgency operations, counter-intelligence operations, and interrogation of the SEP and/or CEP.

##### **ii. E2 Extremism**

This Department mainly focused on monitoring potential extremist activities or organization that threatened the national's security. Examples are:

- a. The Labour Movement or Leftist Movement, based on the masses rally.
- b. Political Parties that were prone to extremist ideologies.
- c. The Student or Youth Movement.

##### **iii. E3 Logistics**

This branch consisted of technical details, such as, the Surveillance, the Technical Aid, as well as, the Technical Administration.

##### **iv. E4 External Communism**

This was one of the important departments that was mainly in charge of the Communist Party influence from abroad, such as, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Thailand Communist Party (TCP), the Vietnamese Communist Party, and, the Soviet Union Communist Party (CCCP). Besides that, the E4 department was also responsible for the security of Malaysia Diplomatic installations on foreign soil, such as, the Malaysian Consulate, the

Embassy, and the High Commissioner Office. This was done by placing Police SB officers abroad, as the Security Attaché.

**v. E5 Security**

The E5 was responsible for monitoring the security of the border checkpoints of Malaysia:

- a. The airport (Domestic or International)
- b. Passport and Travel Control
- c. VIP Security Protections: domestic or International dignitary

**vi. E6 Administration**

This department was responsible for identifying and charting the Communist operational areas, the location of their strongholds, installations and camps, the list of CPM District, the State and Central Committee Members, as well as, managing the financial budget for the Secret Service Fund, to fund the SB for conducting secret operations against the CPM or the “Black Ops”.

**vii. E7 Terrorism**

The E7 branch dealt with terrorist groups and organizations that were other than the Communist Organization.

In order to increase the degree of effectiveness in combating the Communist insurrection, the Police SB units worked closely with the Army Intelligence Divisions. They formed cooperation by exchanging intelligence information, retrieved by each unit members, to ensure the quality and trustworthiness of the intelligence data (Desa Othman, 2015).

**The SB's Roles in Eliminating the CPM during the Second Emergency**

During the Second Emergency, the government's main focus was to eliminate the enemy (Leong, 2012), at all cause. By this time around, the MSF have learnt from their experiences of the First Emergency and were better prepared. The MSF units conducted continuous jungle patrolling in the frontier of Peninsular Malaysia. Their efforts had provided them with huge results on the number of enemies killed. Thus, efficient intelligence was a vital component that led to the success of the MSF in the Second Emergency (Gonzago, 2016).

The communist can be eliminated if the SF hunt them down at their stronghold. As explained, their strongholds were located deep within the jungle. This was a challenge for the MSF to locate and neutralize their threats. However, it was, by far, the only alternative for the government to eliminate their opponents, since the guerrilla warfare cannot be countered using conventional warfare tactics (Singh & Ko, 1971). It must be pursued by conducting military operations in the specified area. During the Second Emergency, the search and destroy operations were conducted by coordinating the Malaysian Armed Forces, particularly, the Malaysian Army, and, the Royal Malaysian Police Field Force (Ghows, 2014).

The role of the SB during the Second Emergency was to provide intelligence resources, needed to hunt down the Communist. Leong (2015) stated that the SB's roles and functions were important in determining the successful outcome of counterinsurgency operations, the SB was a legally established organization in the government service which gather intelligence, irrespective of extremism, politics, or whatever threats that could potentially occur. However, during the First and the Second Emergency, the SB were focused on the intelligence activities of the enemy. The SB will provide provisional action plan, and operational aspect, will be given to the Army or the Police Field Forces.

Meanwhile Chan (2016), also explained the roles of SB in the Second Emergency by stating that the main priority of the SB in the Second Emergency was safeguarding the national security of Malaysia from the CPM armed insurrection. Similar to the First Emergency, the role of the SB was to gather intelligence information, but this time, the main focus was to monitor intelligence from outside of the country: accessing any security threat coming from foreign country since during that time, majority of countries in Southeast Asia were covered with communist organization movements and subversion. At the same time,

(Roslan, 2015) also stressed that “the SB had a greater responsibility in monitoring politically-based movement and organisation in the country because the CPM had established the Communist United Front (CUF), as part of the Communist new approach, to penetrate political movement through legalized form of activities”.

The CPM was determined to launch a full-scale offensive operation in urban capital areas through heavy infiltration. They had diverted their focus from jungles to town areas when they began to form underground cells, in the capital of Kuala Lumpur, and other main cities in Peninsular Malaysia (Leong, 2012). The Communist subversive underground movement reached the peak of their activities in 1974, during which, numerous assassinations on the SF high ranking officials, and various acts of violence, had been initiated. Kuala Lumpur was their main target for underground cells when they operated their movement (Hashim, 2001).

The reason for this was, Kuala Lumpur was well equipped with logistics, which were convenient for future resupply of basic equipment (food, medicine, as well as tools that were to be used in weaponry and armament productions) (Leong, 2012). The CPM's infiltration in urban areas was led by the Labour Movement and political parties that were under the influence of Socialist Front, the Student's Association, and the Workers Union (Ho, 2015). These organizations have a tendency to be easily indoctrinated by the CPM's propaganda work cells.

### **Penetration of the CPM Underground Communication System**

From 1970's and upwards, the SB had taken several actions on the countermeasures tactics in order to destroy the CPM's underground cells that operated at the heart of Kuala Lumpur (Leong, 2012). The main objective of the SB department was to eliminate the CPM's subversive communication systems that were hard to be detected by the SF. The CPM did not change their medium of communication, since the First Emergency, as they relied on their sympathizers, or the Min Yuen cells (Chin, 1994). The *Min Yuen* was the main communication line for the CPM to send directives and orders, through their most trusted agents. These agents lived among the population and, hence, it was hard to determine which citizens were members of the CPM underground units (Asli, 1993). They had their own method of communication which were well protected with a great amount secrecy.

Why was it hard to eliminate the CPM underground organisation? Undeniably, it was the most challenging moment for the SB operatives. (Gonzago, 2016) stated that the CPM's underground organizations were cunning and very cautious in protecting their mass communication system, through the implementation of various secretive tactics that were only known by strong supporters of the organization. However, even if one is a member of the CPM, it does not mean that he will be given access to the underground organisation. The system was very secretive. These tactics were taught during the “baptism of fire” course, based on the books or notes written by the CCP cadres, during their revolutionary war against the Nationalist Army in China (Leong, 2012). To hunt down the CPM mass communication, the SB had to carry out various strategies and tactics. These tactics were normally learnt with the help and cooperation from the SEP or CEP. Both the SEP and CEP were valuable assets for the SB, for intelligence purposes (Roslan, 2015).

### **Introduction of Special Grade Agent (SGA) and Counter-Intelligence Operations against the CPM**

During the Second Emergency, the SB had utilized new methods and tactics to carry out counter-intelligence operations against the CPM secret underground movement. One of the methods was the use of Special Grade Agents (SGA). SGA as defined by (Gonzago, 2016) was “an established body of the SEP, former enemy members, or anybody who had specific talents that were required by the SB. For example, those who had the ability to speak various Chinese dialects, or those who had connections, with the CPM underground members”.

The SGA will be trained by the SB before they were sent to the field for counter-intelligence mission. Trainings were conducted to sharpen their tactics and skills on the field. The SGA was paid by the SB with a certain amount of allowances, depending on the types of the information delivered to the SB, such as, clues that led to the capturing and killing of the enemy (Chan, 2016). In order to become an effective agent, the SGA must conceal their identity from the enemy with great secrecy. If the SGA's identity was blown, the

SGA might be transferred to field jobs, such as, combatant duties. This meant becoming interpreter, jungle tracker or guide.

The SB was brilliant in manipulating the tactics of disguise for their counterintelligence operations. (Leong, 2015) stated that "In the Second Emergency, we deployed a lot of secret operations, periodically we dressed up as the enemy while infiltrating and living with them, particularly because of that, we were somehow successful in stopping the enemy from sending troops". Eventually, the SEP and CEP will provide continuous intelligence on their old fellow comrades so that the SB can eliminate the Communist continuously".

### **The SB Tactics in Destroying the CPM Food Dumps, Arms Caches, and Secret DLB**

The search and destroy operations were carried out by the MSF, in order to locate the enemy and neutralize them completely. The priority of the SB was to destroy the food dump, arms caches, and secret directive letters hidden by the CPM guerrilla in secure locations in the jungle (Navaratnam, 2001). The SF, however, faced difficulty in locating food dumps, based on the marks or clues that led them to the secret dump sites. These secret locations were known as food dump or arms caches dump. It was the location where the Communist stashed their supplies of food, weapon, and ammunition to be used in the future. These were quite similar to self-storage which enabled the enemy to secure their logistics and equipment until it was the appropriate time for them to distribute or make use of their supplies (Roslan, 2015). Secret directive letters were secret messages or instructions, written in small rolled slips, left by the CPM guerrillas in secure locations. The place where the rolled slips were hidden was known as Dead Letter Boxes (DLB).

The DLB was one of the methods used by the CPM to communicate between their satellite organizations and the underground movements (Leong, 2012). The CPM did not use radio transmitter since the First Emergency, though they had their own radio transmitter, due to security reasons. The wireless signals and waves could be detected by the SF and can disclose their position based on the transmitter that was sent (Saad, 1984). In fact, Malaysia's rainforest and mountain terrains will limit the range of the transmitted radio waves and made the communication attempt useless. Thus, the CPM resorted to using traditional methods of communication by sending their secret messages and directive instruction through jungle courier.

There were two types of DLB. The first DLB were hidden in the jungle, and the rest were hidden in the town. The DLB were hid in the safest place. A place unthinkable by the public. For instance, the bus stops pole, the jungle fringe, and the rubber estate plantation (under the latex cup) (Navaratnam, 2001). For safety reasons, the Communist will operate their DLB periodically at a time (one or two months per message). At the same time, the Communist also used the newspapers' advertisements to send their messages to other Assault groups and Regiments (Chan, 2016). This method was considered as tricky and hard to be detected by the SB, unless the readers were exceptionally familiar with the codes and secret messages used by the CPM guerrillas.

How did the SB locate and find the DLB? According to Chan (2016), the information regarding DLB positions were retrieved through the interrogation of the SEP/ CEP. Nevertheless, it also depended how well the enemy knew the exact location of the DLB. In other words, the higher the rank of the SEP in their former organization, the likely for him to know more information about DLB positions. Besides that, the SB might also receive certain intelligence information from loyal communist supporters, as these supporters might be in charge of supplying food and logistics to the CPM Min Yuen organization (Asli, 1993). The CPM were particularly concerned with the safety of the DLB. If the DLB was discovered by the SF, it will jeopardize the security of the entire mass communication system, as well as leading to the possibility of the SF infiltrating their underground organization (Roslan, 2015). Thus, in order to safeguard the DLBs, they were buried in the ground beside prominent landmarks like trees, or rocks (Navaratnam, 2001). The CPM guerrillas will scratch on the tree or rock, leaving marks for the other parties (enemy units who operated in the area) to identify and pick up the DLB later. The secret letters (rolled slips) were wrapped in plastic, or, put in a tin can, to prevent the materials from being covered by mud or moisture from the jungle surroundings.

Finding food dumps was the main role of the SB in the event of the Second Emergency (Gonzago, 2016). Nevertheless, it was important for the CPM to protect the location of the food dump, arms caches, and the safety of the DLB at all cause, in order to ensure that their revolutionary war will last. In order to protect the locations of their food dump, the CPM guerrillas had initiated secret tactics to identify the location. This was done by marking the sites using secret signs, which were taught only to selected cadres or underground organization members. The purpose of the marks was as a signage to identify and locate the secure dump that were buried or concealed properly in the jungle floor. Those marks were a secret for the CPM organization and only the person in charge of the supplies and logistics (*Min Yuen*), or the Communist cell leader, will know how to identify those markings, since the signs were made using several symbols, such as scratches on trees and ground, or, even made from available natural resources, such as wood, leaves, bamboo sticks, and small rocks that were scattered all over the jungle (Navaratnam, 2001). Thus, only well-trained eyes can identify those marks.

To one extent, even the Communist had a tough time in identifying the marks of their secure food dump locations. The question here is how did the SF locate the Communist food dumps during jungle sweeper operation? Generally, the SF had obtained the methods of locating the signs of the dump through the SEP and CEP. They cooperated during the interrogation process, by giving sketches of the signs, or marks, to identify the secure dumps. This was highlighted by (Leong, 2015) who stressed that “in order to find the location of the enemy’s hidden dump supplies, we depended fully on the information given by the SEP and CEP, particularly, the guerrilla members of the CPM satellite organization, who were normally told the exact locations, to set up a safe place to hide the food dumps, because under normal circumstances, even continuous jungle patrolling by the SF, within the suspected areas could not help in locating the food dumps”.

The SB compiled the information and they later on realized that the best way to explain to the officers and members of the jungle patrols, were by conducting “Special Class”, known as, intelligence courses between the Police and the Military Intelligence Division of the Malaysian Army. As a result, every platoon commander and their NCO’s that acted as deputy platoon commander was sent for the Intelligence Courses, in order to study how to locate and identify the signs and symbols that were synonymous with the locations of the CPM food dumps, arms caches, and DLB’s position (Gonzago, 2016).

Information of the Special Courses conducted by the SB were highly classified, as (Gonzago, 2016) highlighted “Definitely there was a course being taught in the SB School named “Field Craft”. This course was compulsory for the SB operatives who have served in the forces at least four years, in order to enhance their skills, in counter-intelligence tactics. The seminars were taught by experts in counter-guerrilla warfare, and the courses were divided into several classes. Every class has its own module, which must be learnt by the SB operatives. Among the modules taught were counter-intelligence operations, the art of espionage, manipulation of the SEP, and the art of interrogation, wiretapping, and interpreting enemy’s secret messages”.

(Chan, 2016) also mentioned his personal experiences participating in the intelligence course “In the SB intelligence courses, they have basic courses involved with the participation of various branches of the Police Department: VAT 69 Police Commando, Police Field Force (Jungle Squads), and Special Tactics Units. This joint intelligence courses were conducted for the purpose of increasing the effectiveness of the Police experts in counter-intelligence, counter-guerrilla warfare skills and advancement. In certain times, some of the SB field officers were sent to England, to attend basic intelligence course conducted by the British Scotland Yard Intelligence Division”.

It was compulsory for every SB operative to attend the basic courses. Among the modules taught in the SB School were, introduction to Communism philosophy, counter-guerrilla warfare tactics, tactics of field surveillance, the arts of effective interrogation on the enemy, basic courses of interpretation of enemy secret messages and codes, weapons tactics in guerrilla warfare, and other modules that were important for the SB field operative’s knowledge on the field (Gonzago, 2016). In the event of the Second Emergency, the main task and routine of the MSF was to search and destroy the enemy by jungle patrolling the areas that were suspected to be the Communist fortification (Leong, 2015). The long range combat patrol group, either the army, or, the police “jungle squad”, will follow the intelligence given by the SB. Besides locating and destroying the enemy, the success of the military combat jungle patrol was also attributed to operations that aimed at denying any form of food supplies to the Communist forces. The most important role for the MSF jungle squad was to locate and destroy the food dumps that were hidden in the Malayan jungle.

The purposes for locating and destroying the food dump were to ensure that the CPM guerrilla forces will not obtain sufficient food supply, as well as to cut off their food sources directly. The CPM, especially, the *Min Yuen* units, were responsible in providing their forces with a secure location buried with a stash of food (Asli, 1993). The reason why the food dump was created by the Communist was to provide continuous food supplies for the guerrilla's everyday consumptions, or, in certain cases, to provide supplies during an emergency, where food was scarce and rationed by the government authority. Several types of dried food were also in their ration list, such as, dried meat (pork was popular), dried anchovies, and salted fish, as these types of food were easy to preserve and can be kept for a long period of time (National Archives, 1957).

Besides canned and dry foods, the enemy also depended on supplies that they smuggled, and hid at safer pickup point, which will be collected later by the guerrillas. Besides food dumps, several arms caches and secret directive letters were hidden in secret locations that the CPM guerrillas felt were strategically secure. Weaponry equipment such as explosives and ammunition bullets were stacked into secure locations, for example, "in deep underground tunnel, or in the stash or pile of logwood, where the location was easily covered with natural bushes and surrounding vegetation" (Navaratnam, 2001). The location of food dumps and arms cache were usually located nearby their permanent base camps. Through the help of the CEP and SEP, the SB had compiled dozens of sketches to describe the signs used by the Communist guerrillas. Needless to say, there were hundreds of these signs. However, due to security and confidentiality reasons, only a few of them were disclosed to the public, for the purpose of academic reference.

## Conclusion

The SB had demonstrated their capabilities in neutralizing the CPM threats effectively, especially, in the Second Emergency. Their skills in hunting down the Communist guerrillas were remarkable. It was, by far, the toughest task, as the SB units were given a huge responsibility to shoulder. They had to make risky moves and work in dangerous environments, in order to provide the MSF units with accurate, reliable and trusted intelligence resources.

SB operatives faced the most danger from being caught and killed by the CPM Underground Organization members. This was because they carried out various counter-intelligence missions on field to penetrate the CPM organization, through espionage and reconnaissance activities, for the purpose of intelligence gathering. There were several incidents where the SB operatives, mostly Chinese, were shot to death by the famous AWF CPM guerrilla units in the 1970s (Hashim, 2001). Sacrificing lives was a price that the country was willing to pay, in order to protect the security of the nation from invasion.

The intelligence information provided by the SB was of good qualities. Intelligence information became one of the most vital key that determined the MSF's success in eliminating the CPM armed insurrection. The CPM finally surrendered in 1989 (Chin, 1994). In the event that Malaya did not establish an SB unit, the outcome of the war against the Communist insurrection might be different than the present. The SB Department exists until today and still operates effectively even after 58 years.

The operations conducted in the Second Emergency were quite similar to the ones carried out in the First Emergency, though in the second period, the operations were greatly improved with the use of good qualities of intelligence information. The intelligence division of the MSF had been excellent after the SB had restructured their organization. Through the aid of the SEP and CEP, the MSF was able to effectively retrieve intelligence on the CPM satellite organization. Information were obtained by using various tactics taught by the SEP. This was the main factor that contributed to the success of the MSF as the counter-intelligence operations led to the destruction of the CPM.

In 1980, the CPM was outnumbered and outmanoeuvred by the MSF, and, with the decline of the international Communist Bloc, it became clear that the collapse of Communism and Socialism worldwide was inevitable. This resulted the CPM to change their conduct by disarming their party through peace negotiation agreements, which took place in 1989. Their struggles ended in vain. The sacrifices made by the SF have allowed us to achieve today's peace. Without their sweat, blood, and tears, the country would not be able to achieve what have become today. The next chapter will focus on the comparative analysis of the SB's tactics and strategies between the First and the Second Emergency.

## References

- Asli, M. R. H. (1993). *Pemberontakan Bersenjata Komunis di Malaysia*. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa & Pustaka.
- Chan, K. K. (2016). Interview with Former Special Branch Staff Officer E1A (SB Communist Underground Sections) (1951-1984). Bandar Menjalara, Kepong, Selangor on 8 April 2016.
- Chin, A. (1994). *The Communist Party of Malaya: The Inside Story*. Kuala Lumpur: Vinpress.
- Comber, L. (2008). *Malaya's Secret Police 1945-1960: The Role of the Special Branch in the Malayan Emergency*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Ghows, M. A. H. (2014). *Reminiscences of Insurrection: Malaysia's Battle against Terrorism 1960-1990*. Kuala Lumpur: Wangsa Zam Publications.
- Gonzago, S. K. (2016). Interview with Former SB field operatives and Commander of Bukit Aman Special Branch E3M (Special Tactics and Operations) (1956-1992). Bandar Utama, Petaling Jaya, Selangor on 5 April 2016.
- Hashim, S. (2001). *The Malaysia Army Battle Against the Communist Insurgency 1968-1989*. Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Defence.
- Ho, H. L. (2015). *Communist Party of Malaya Armed Insurrection 1968-1989: Resurgence and Re-elimination*. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press.
- Jeshurun, C. (1976). The Security Gap in Peninsular Malaysia, in *Southeast Asian Affairs 1976*. Singapore: Institute of South East Asia Studies.
- Leong, C. W. (2015). Interview with Former Deputy Director of Royal Malaysia Police Special Branch (1981-1984). Seri Kembangan, Selangor on 24 May 2015.
- Leong C. W. (2012). *Scorpio on the Dragon Demise: The Second Malayan Communist Insurgency Emergency 1970-1990*. USA: Rocky Mountain Press.
- Ministry of Home Affairs-MOHA. (1971). *The Resurgence of Communist Threat in West Malaysia*. Malaysia Government Official White Paper. Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information.
- Mohamad Desa, O. (2015) Interview with Othman. Former operative Military Intelligence Special Operations Group, Malaysian Army Intelligence Divisions (1964-1986). Kampung Jalong, Sungai Siput Utara, Perak on 22 July 2015.
- Navaratnam, A. V. (2001). *The Spear and The Kerambit: The Exploits of VAT 69, Malaysia's Elite Fighting Force 1968-1969*. Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publication and Distributor Sdn. Bhd.
- Roslan, M. J. (2015). Interview with Former Police Special Branch operatives (1978-1984). Sungai Besi, Kuala Lumpur on 16 November 2015.
- Saad, I. (1984). The CPM Revolt: Why Fail?, in Khoo Kay Kim & Aznan Nawang. *Darurat 1948-1960*. Kuala Lumpur: Muzium Angkatan Tentera Malaysia.
- Singh, B., & Ko, W. M. (1971). *Theory and Practice of Modern Guerrilla Warfare*. London: Asia Publishing House.
- Yuen, Y. L. (2008). *Nation before Self and Values That Do Not Die*. Kuala Lumpur: MPH Publications.